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CYBER JIHADISM: AN ANALYSIS OF HOW THE
CYBERSPHERE HAS ALTERED ISLAMIC TERRORISM
SIMON SPANGENBERG, UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO
MENTOR: MARIE VASEK
Between 2011 and 2015, more than 30,000 foreigners, including more than
4,000 Westerners, have joined the ranks of ISIS in the Syrian conflict (Schmitt &
Sengupta, 2015). Between 2000 and 2018, 91% of the total victims of terror attacks
in Europe were accounted for by Islamic terrorists, causing a total of 753 fatalities
in that time frame (Le Figaro, 2019). Numerous studies have statistically
demonstrated a continuous surge of new recruits in Islamic terrorist groups such as
ISIS since the beginning of the millennium. Carter, Maher, and Neumann (2014)
attribute this trend to the expansion of technological possibilities in the
cybersphere. They claim that the conflict in Syria is arguably one of the first livedocumented conflicts on social media and video streaming platforms: “In the minds
of the foreign fighters, social media is no longer virtual: it has become an essential
facet of what happens on the ground” (Carter et al., 2014, p. 1). Propaganda and
recruitment encompass only a portion of the online Islamic extremism threat,
however. Training also represents a significant role that Islamic terrorism has on
the cybersphere (Pawlak, 2015). Digital tools are increasingly used to train foreign
recruits. This is most prominently illustrated by the Al-Qaeda-created online
magazine Inspire, which led to the making of two bombs that killed three and
injured approximately 300 in the Boston Marathon in April 2015 (Lemieux,
Brachman, Levitt & Wood, 2014). In this paper, we review and analyze the three
above-mentioned major components of online Jihad: propaganda, recruitment, and
training. Through related work, we propose a formal description and explanation
for the reasons of past superiority of online Islamic terrorism.
The fight against Islamic terrorism is extremely complex and requires
historical understanding of the roots of current conflicts in the Middle East.
Understanding why new recruits join the ranks of Islamic terrorist groups is crucial
for efficiently fighting online terrorism (Rosenblatt, 2019); thus, we provide a brief
historical review of ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the emergence of
radical groups.
Although fighting online terrorism is often neglected, the need to do so is at
an all-time high. Overlooking this necessity has undeniably contributed to the
128

BUTLER JOURNAL OF UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH, VOLUME 6

recent surge of attacks and has perpetuated the formation of powerful groups such
as Al-Qaeda and ISIS (General Intelligence and Security Service, 2012). Although
most nations, organizations, and even independent hacking groups called
“hacktivists” have considerably increased their attention toward online terrorism, a
significant amount still needs to be done to gain the upper hand in the online war
of terror (Ghost Security, 2015). Brantly (2017) notices that a significant challenge
faced by nation-states and governments lies in the innovation and adaptation of
extremist groups’ digital security. In this paper, we discuss several methods to
surveil and fight online terrorism. We identify challenges and promising aspects
concerning the future of the fight against online terrorism. Finally, we offer a model
of potential future threat landscapes related to Islamic radicalization in the
cybersphere.
Background and Definitions
Islamic Terrorism Terminology and Definitions
Terrorism can be defined as the systematic use of violence to achieve
political objectives. It is a tactical asymmetric fight to compensate for the incapacity
of the weak to win over a stronger state opponent. Islamic terrorism includes a
strong religious component derived from an extreme interpretation of the Quran,
Sharia law, and various Hadiths, in which Islamic supremacy (i.e., establishment of
a new worldwide Islamic caliphate) is viewed as the ultimate goal.1 This goal is
attained by conducting a Jihad (literally translated as “struggle” or “striving”), or
holy war, against unbelievers (kafir). Islamic terrorism takes different forms and
has multiple roots and origins going as far back as the 11th century CE.
Historical Review
To gain support from Arabic movements during World War I and to help
defeat the Ottoman Empire, France and the United Kingdom promised to support
the creation of an Arabic state after the war ended. Simultaneously, the British
government issued the so-called Balfour Declaration supporting the establishment
of “a national home for Jewish people” in Palestine (Kepel, 2004). After the fall of
the Ottoman Empire, France and the United Kingdom betrayed their promise by
secretly agreeing to partition the Arabic territories of the former Ottoman Empire
under their respective colonial control. The period between World Wars I and II is
consequentially characterized by the emergence of an Arabic nationalism and
Islamism as well as by the development of Zionism (via different waves of
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migration of Jewish people in Palestine). After World War II, the important oil
resources of the region became a major component of the subsequent Cold War
between the Soviet Union and the United States. The creation of Israel in 1948
ignited the war between the new Jewish state and its Arabic neighbors in support
of the Palestinian people. This period was dominated largely by Palestinian
terrorism.
An important development is the change of power in Iran in 1979 with the
arrival of Ayatollah Khomeini. For the first time in the region, an Islamic Shia state
was created, which introduced a new form of Islamic terrorism against Western
states. Concurrently, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan constituted a turning point
in the development of modern Islamic terrorism. Weakened by the fall of the Shah
in Iran, the United States would not allow the creation of a USSR satellite state in
the region. Together with Saudi Arabia, the United States started supporting
Muslim opponents and Afghan mujahideen (Islamic fighters) factions. The
withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 resulted in the fall of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War. During the following years of civil war in Afghanistan,
different Islamic groups were trained with the intention of exporting their newly
gained skills to other parts of the world (notably Algeria, Bosnia, and Chechnya).
Not gaining enough recognition, some groups—Al-Qaeda in particular—turned to
global terrorism, September 11 being the most representative moment of this
evolution.
The succeeding “War on Terror” on countries associated with Al-Qaeda,
along with the killing of Abu Abdallah Usama bin Laden, has reduced the influence
of this movement but has also given rise to a new and more violent group called
ISIS/ISIL. In 2014, ISIS/ISIL, led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, established a caliphate
over a significant part of Iraq and Syria. During this period, the Islamic group
conducted terrorist attacks on numerous countries, particularly in Europe (Paris,
Brussels, Nice, London, Stockholm, etc.).
Online Jihad
The use of the online sphere as a platform for Jihad is endemic to Islamic
terrorism and has exponentially increased in the past decade (Brantly, 2017). In
2005, Ayman al-Zawahiri (2nd General Emir of Al-Qaeda) openly denoted the
media to be an inclusive part of the battlefield (Carter et al., 2014). Terrorist groups
have successfully learned to use complex online tools that ensure anonymity and
protection to communicate and coordinate their affairs. We recognize the
materialization of this development through three main fundamentals: propaganda,
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recruitment, and training. For each of these points, we identify several attack
vectors exploited by Islamic terrorists, which have contributed to their ascendance
in the online war of terror.
Propaganda
Based on related work, we detect a number of tools used by jihadists as
means for diffusing motivational material, such as social media, media centers,
online magazines, and video games. From the infamous video of American hostage
Nick Berg’s beheading by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in 2004, to the use of social
media and the creation of online magazines, Islamic extremists have exploited
many different techniques to rally individuals to their cause. For instance, as
Pawlak (2015) notes, Al-Qaeda has “openly encouraged cyber Jihad as a sacred
duty of every Muslim and called upon its followers to hack western websites” (p.
1). This call has quickly been answered by a prominent British-Islamic figure called
Abu Hussain al-Britani, also known as “TriCk,” most notorious for hacking Tony
Blair’s account and joining the ranks of ISIL in 2013. Jihadi groups have quickly
understood the influence of social media. Platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and
Instagram have allowed jihadists to share and promote their views. Berger and
Morgan (2015) estimate that in September 2014, between 46,000 and 70,000
Twitter accounts were linked to ISIS. Several of these profiles reached thousands
of followers, one particular example being the ISIS-affiliated Twitter account
@reyardiraq, with more than 90,000 followers (Brantly, 2017).
Social media is also used as an outlet for newly emerged centralized media
centers such as “al-Hayat,” “al-Sahab,” and “al-Furquan.” These media centers
often exhibit well-edited Islamic propaganda videos, using advanced technological
cameras and drones to depict often severely contrasted sceneries. For instance,
amongst the shocking films of beheadings, ISIS has crafted impressive video series
such as Harvest of the Soldiers, which include almost weekly releases and updates
of pure military advertising material (Zelin, 2019). The Islamic State (ISIS/ISIL)
often contrasts its videos of strength and violence with displays of peace, happiness,
and prosperity in its controlled cities. ISIS’s efforts to portray a form of utopia to
undermine the humanitarian crisis occurring in its occupied cities is verified
through a study led by Tarabay, Shiloach, Weiss, and Gilat (2015), in which the
authors found that 45% of the Islamic State’s propaganda focuses on its endeavors
to build and sustain the caliphate by portraying hospitals, charity work, agricultural
projects, and roadworks.
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Media outlets and forums have also allowed terrorist groups to publish new
types of propaganda material, such as online magazines and video games (Al-Rawi,
2016). One of the most notorious examples is Al-Qaeda’s online magazine Inspire,
thought to be the work of English-speaking jihadi Anwar al-Awlaki, also known as
the “bin Laden of the Internet” (“Online Preachers,” 2011). Figure 1 depicts
instructions given in the magazine relating to propaganda and wide distribution of
the media.

Figure 1. Propaganda message given in the eighth issue of Al-Qaeda’s online
magazine Inspire (Zelin, 2019).

For the first time, Islamic extremist groups have implemented impressive
technological tools to modernize their propaganda campaigns. As established in a
study led by Al-Rawi (2016), groups such as ISIS base most of their marketing
strategies on emphasizing simple ideological appeals,2 greatly facilitated through
the use of the cybersphere. Islamic terrorists build their media strategies on three
main traits, as explained by Haroro J. Ingram (2014): the use of multidimensional
and multiplatform approaches to instantaneously target individuals and enhance the
scope and importance of messaging; the organization of narratives and deeds to
amplify operational and strategic outcomes in the field; and the centrality of the
Islamic State brand.
Recruitment
Patryk Pawlak (2015) notes that “the internet has not only altered traditional
channels for radicalization and facilitated a two-way communication between
terrorist organizations and their supporters, but also allowed for a change in
planning, coordination and execution of attacks” (p. 1). The distribution of
propaganda through social media is only the first step toward successful
radicalization and recruitment (Al-Rawi, 2016). Jihadists tend to distrust platforms
for direct communication and rely on more developed digital operational security
(OPSEC) techniques to target specific individuals (Brantly, 2017). As soon as the
first contacts have been made, jihadists rely on mobile messaging applications like
Viber, Telegram, and Redphone to directly communicate with their potential
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targets. Brantly (2017) observes in his study that high levels of online
“safeguarding” are required for a potential recruit to make his way into terrorist
groups. Through the analysis of thousands of posts in forums and social media,
Brantly establishes a list of communication tools that are either positively or
negatively regarded by extremists. The list of applications that are considered “safe
to use” by jihadists includes but is not restricted to Signal, Linphone, Vimeo, Gmail,
and Telegram. Unsafe tools include Skype, iCloud, and Tor Mail. A strong
recognition is made on the Silent Phase software, which is often considered to offer
“secure solutions for voice, browsing and messaging” (p. 91).
ISIS also regularly uses video games as a measure to radicalize younger
individuals. Shooting game Arma 3 includes a specific ISIS mod,3 easily accessible
via online download (Scimeca, 2015). In addition, an adaptation of Grand Theft
Auto V called “Salil al-Sawarem” (The Clanging of the Swords) was popularized
in 2014. In this adaptation, the user takes control of a jihadist in his struggle to
restore the caliphate and combat the infidels. Such means are clearly intended to
target a younger set of individuals and idealize the daily life of an Islamic fighter.
Al-Rawi (2016) notes that with high-definition video games and entertaining
missions, the user is lured into believing that ISIS is a technologically advanced
group fighting for genuine and authentic beliefs. Finally, ISIS also introduced a
self-made Android application available for free download on the Google Store.
“Dawn of the Glad Tidings” was a Twitter-based application that automatically
posted ISIS-related tweets on the user’s account. Although the lifetime of this
application was quite limited, Berger and Morgan (2015) and Stern and Berger
(2016) noted that the application reached a peak of 40,000 tweets a day.
Training
Through the expansion of the online sphere, jihadists have rapidly
discovered that the Internet is not only a place for radicalization, recruitment, and
propaganda but also for knowledge sharing. In this section, we recognize two main
attack vectors used by Islamic groups to train recruits in the cybersphere: digital
protection vectors and military threat vectors.

Digital Protection Vectors
Most of the general techniques required to maintain anonymity and privacy
over the Internet are not generally known by the average user. Developing some
techniques to preserve online security requires a minimum amount of training,
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which, as Brantly (2017) notes, is often promoted by social media accounts linked
to terrorist groups. For instance, the Telegram account @Software_ENG, also
named Tiqani al-Dawlah al-Islamiyyah,4 has been known to post hundreds of
training documents on forums and websites linked to implementing strong digital
OPSEC techniques. Another instance is depicted by Mula’ib al-Assina’s response
to a question related to the use of Skype through Tor on the Minbar forum: “Skype
is insecure, and Americans are recording every single call since 2008” (Brantly,
2017, p. 86). It is important to note that most of the material covered and questions
asked on such platforms are quite trivial and do not dig deep into digital operational
security. Nevertheless, such activity clearly indicates a high interest and concern
from jihadists about digital OPSEC and illustrates that the online sphere and
cybersecurity techniques have become a crucial asset for their operations.

Military Threat Vectors
The emergence of certain media outlets and online document-sharing
platforms has allowed the creation of so-called do-it-yourself terrorism (Pawlak,
2015). This modern practice of Jihad is most prominently illustrated through online
journals and magazines released in several volumes by groups such as Al-Qaeda
and ISIS. Al-Qaeda is one of the first groups to release easy-to-access online
training documents, like the journal al-Battar,5 which served predominantly as a
virtual training camp, encouraging weapons of mass destruction and teaching
explosive handling and kidnapping techniques, amongst many others (CohenAlmagor, 2016). A more notorious example of Al-Qaeda’s online training tools
relates to the 17-volume online magazine Inspire. Inspire became influent
throughout the world as it was fully aimed at English readership (i.e., Western
recruits). Studying the influence of Inspire, Lemieux et al. (2014) note that the
magazine seems to target a “less intellectually engaged audience” around the world,
particularly in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Lemieux et
al. (2014) also note that one of the reasons for the magazine’s infamy relates to the
“Open Source Jihad” section. This section of Inspire covers in great detail a variety
of skills to learn—from weapon handling to bomb making—and was allegedly used
by Dzhokhar Tsarnaev and his brother, Tamerlan, in the 2013 Boston Marathon
bombings. Figure 2 illustrates an extract from the step-by-step process of making
an acetone peroxide bomb in the “Open Source Jihad” section of Inspire’s sixth
volume. The primary explosive material used in the Paris and Brussels bombings
was triacetone triperoxide, a trimer form of the mixture of acetone and hydrogen
peroxide (Alfred, 2016). The aforementioned arguments clearly illustrate the fact
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that today, to pursue Jihad, modern terrorists require only a sufficient Internet
connection.

Figure 2. Extract from the step-by-step procedure of the making of an acetone
peroxide bomb. This figure appeared in the sixth issue of Al-Qaeda’s online magazine
Inspire and was part of the “Open Source Jihad” section (Zelin, 2019). For security
purposes, the rest of the instructions have been omitted here.
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The Fight against Online Islamic Terrorism
Since the early 2010s, the threat of online terrorism has become publicly
acknowledged and many entities have significantly increased their digital
counterterrorism measures. To analyze the fight against online Islamic terrorism,
we focus our research on three main actors: governments and international
organizations, companies, and independent groups. For each of these groups, we
discuss policies and measures taken to tackle online terrorism. We also consider
newly emerging groups that have considerably helped nation-states improve their
trailing position in the online war of terror.
Governments and International Organizations
The international coalition against online terrorism is structured around
three main pillars: “constraining the use of the internet by jihadi organizations,”
“strengthening de-radicalization efforts,” and “limiting access to funding” (Pawlak,
2015, p. 2). Nation-states’ efforts to combat online terrorism via several platforms
have drastically amplified over past years. Initial government responses included
social media campaigns6 and unsuccessful countermessaging techniques (“Digital
Counterterrorism,” 2018). Although many of these attempts have been unable to
compete against the propaganda tactics implemented by jihadists so far,
international initiatives continue to grow and challenge the spread of online
terrorism.
Many nation-states recognized that cutting Islamic extremist groups’
financing would ultimately result in those groups’ extinction. This led to the 2015
UN Resolution 2199, which condemns any form of trade associated with groups
such as Al-Qaeda (“Unanimously Adopting,” 2015). A few government initiatives
and offensive responses to Islamic terrorism have proven successful, however. For
instance, in 2016, the National Security Agency and the United States Cyber
Command successfully conducted a joint offensive operation called Glowing
Symphony, with the purpose to disrupt and deny ISIS’s ability to coordinate and
conduct attacks against the United States and its allies (Martelle, 2018). This
operation is considered one of the most significant and successful cyber offensive
operations undertaken by the United States.
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Companies
A most recent initiative, called the Christchurch Call, led by New Zealand’s
prime minister Jacinda Ardern and French president Emmanuel Macron, aims to
encourage all major tech companies to eliminate any form of terrorism and violent
extremist content online (Roy, 2019). Major companies are playing a crucial role
in the fight against cyber Jihad. As most of the propaganda content flows through
social media, many of these companies recognize the fight against online
extremism as a responsibility and a duty. In 2015, Twitter announced the
suspension of 10,000 ISIS-linked accounts in one day (Gladstone, 2015). Two years
later, YouTube announced the removal of the lectures and sermons of prominent
Islamic preacher Anwar al-Awlaki (Wallace & Townsend, 2017). Furthermore,
Google’s recent Jigsaw Project presents a modern face in combatting Islamic
propaganda and dismantling extremism networks. This project aims to be “a
platform for former violent extremists to collaborate, in order to prevent young
people from joining extremism groups” (“Jigsaw,” n.d).
Independent Groups
The rise in online Islamic terrorism has also resulted in the enlisting of
independent hacking groups, also called hacktivists. Following the Paris Charlie
Hebdo attacks in 2015, hacktivist group Anonymous publicly declared war on ISIS
through the #OpISIS campaign and removed 20,000 ISIS-related Twitter accounts
(Rogers, 2015). Another prominent group engaged in the battle against
cyberterrorism is Ghost Security Group. To date, Ghost Security Group claims to
have identified more than 100,000 extremist social media accounts used primarily
for recruitment, and to monitor more than 200 known violent extremist websites
(“Ghost Security,” n.d).
Ways Forward
Beyond a more stringent international and national legal order and the
effective involvement of online platforms and social media, the increasing level of
threat sophistication of the cybersphere and its mastering by terrorist groups require
constant adaptation. Since the 2013 Snowden leaks, companies have significantly
increased their use of robust encryption methods in their consumer-communication
technologies, which has strongly challenged authorities to efficiently track
terrorists online (“Digital Counterterrorism,” 2018). Brantly (2017) described the
necessity behind jihadists’ adaptation and innovation on current online
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technologies. Strong digital OPSEC has become a vital need for groups such as AlQaeda and ISIS to exist. It is therefore natural to assume that the future war on
terror will occur mainly online. Social media and forums are only a small part of
the danger that Islamic terrorist groups represent, and as technological means
expand, so does the jihadi threat landscape.
Recent findings and developments seem to suggest that artificial
intelligence will become a major asset for tracking, monitoring, and surveilling
Islamic extremism activities on the Internet. According to a report published by the
Capgemini Research Institute, 56% of 850 surveyed senior executives in
cybersecurity claim that their security analysts are overwhelmed by the increasingly
sophisticated threat levels (Tolido, Van Der Linden, Thieullent, & Frank, 2019).
The need to further incorporate automation and artificial intelligence as tools for
detection and response to cyber threats has become crucial. Through the
development of machine learning and data-mining algorithms, companies and
public authorities could potentially classify data collected from past attacks to
model trends that would determine high-risk scenarios and prevent future attacks
(Beuchelt, 2020). Beuchelt (2020) notes that, “using temporal analytics as well as
structured and unstructured data analysis and integration, companies can build
complex social media and other open source intelligence models to predict future
attacks” (para. 10). Counter Extremism Project’s eGlyph technology and Google’s
recent Jigsaw Project both illustrate new types of automated mass-tracking
algorithms, which, if used properly, could lead to astonishing positive results
(“How CEP’s eGLYPH Technology Works,” 2016).
Link analysis (defined as a method to evaluate relationships between nodes
in a network) is an interesting technique used to study information surrounding
high-stake targets (Carafano, 2005). This method could allow efficient large-scale
analysis of a suspect’s relationships as well as his or her links to a terrorist
organization. All of the aforementioned implementations, however, require a
significant dependence on available and structured data. Although the fields of
machine learning, data mining, and data analysis are exponentially growing, they
still face challenges when trying to process natural languages or when manipulating
nonstructured data such as images, text mixtures, videos, and sensor information
(Carafano, 2005).
Online security is often considered a “cat and mouse” game. As security
strengthens, so do threats and attacks. Although artificial intelligence and dataanalysis algorithms could be used to secure systems and fight online terrorism,
these techniques could also be used by Islamic terrorists to widen their online range
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and social-engineering techniques. For instance, artificial intelligence could be
deployed to enhance terrorists’ online propaganda campaigns by implementing an
algorithm that sends tweets faster and with a higher success rate than a human could
(Tolido et al., 2019). The need to recognize that the threat vectors of terrorist attacks
will drastically change in the future is of paramount importance (“Cyberterrorism,”
2009). Because of the interconnectivity revolution of the past few decades, critical
infrastructures such as hospitals, power plants (specifically nuclear plants),
transportation infrastructures, and banks are prone to becoming terrorists’ next
targets of value. There is no definite answer to ensure protection against terrorist
threats in the cybersphere, but cooperation and intelligence sharing will be critical
for the containment of such threats (Collins, n.d).
The need for public and law enforcement authorities to design adequate and
reactive cross-border cooperation tools has been highlighted by the European
Union after the series of terrorist attacks that hit a number of its member states in
2015 and 2016. In September 2018, the European Commission adopted a legislative
proposal on “preventing the dissemination of terrorist content online” (European
Commission, 2018). The regulation introduces a removal order that can be issued
as an administrative or judicial decision by a competent authority in a member state.
In such cases, the hosting service provider is obliged to remove the content or to
disable access to the content within one hour. The regulation requires hosting
service providers, where appropriate, to take proactive measures proportionate to
the level of risk and to remove terrorist material from their services, including
through the deployment of automated detection tools. Failure to act within an hour
after a removal order has been placed by a member state could result in fines of up
to 4% of the hosting service provider’s annual revenue (“European Parliament,”
2019).
Opponents of this proposal—such as Tim Berners-Lee, founder of the
World Wide Web—claim that the proposed regulation is an attack on freedom of
speech and would impair the Internet in Europe without strengthening the fight
against online terrorism (Baker, Berners-Lee & Cerf, 2019). The proposal is still in
discussion between the European Union’s colegislators because of concerns
expressed by the European Parliament about possible abuses of removal orders and
restriction of freedom of speech (Creighton, 2019).
Despite these criticisms, adoption of the regulation could represent a major
milestone in the fight against online Islamic terrorism. Lucinda Creighton (2019),
Senior Advisor at the Counter Extremism Project, explained: “Of the 1.5 million
videos of the attack in Christchurch, New Zealand, that were detected and
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eventually removed by Facebook, only 1.2 million were screened and blocked by
Facebook’s software before being uploaded. This left 300,000 videos uploaded to
the platform for users to see” (para. 2).
The way companies and public authorities shape new regulations and
approach technical advancements will undoubtedly be crucial for the future of
online counterterrorism. Collins (n.d) argues that the way we approach online
counterterrorism must change, as we need to adapt to new rules, new technologies,
and new players. Ultimately, technical developments and legal frameworks will
need to properly balance public security needs with freedom of speech and
individual data-protection requirements.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a cohesive narrative of the way Islamic
terrorists use the cybersphere to conduct their Jihad and how nation-states have
reacted to the threat posed by such groups. We have selectively reviewed online
methods used by Islamic groups in the “Online Jihad” section by analyzing three
key components to their success—namely propaganda, recruitment, and training.
Our analysis illustrates that Islamic terrorist groups’ influence over the cybersphere
is as significant as it has ever been and has undeniably led to major attacks over the
past decade. Our findings also indicate that Islamic groups were evidently leading
the online war of terror over the past few years as most nation-states failed to
recognize the online threat that Islamic extremism represents.
We then focused our study on ways in which the fight against online
terrorism is conducted, in the section called “The Fight against Online Islamic
Terrorism,” by identifying three major attack vectors: governments and
international organizations, companies, and independent groups. Our findings
suggest that international response to online jihadism has significantly increased
over the past decade, considerably decreasing the gap between nation-states and
terrorist groups in the cybersphere.
Finally, we have identified, in the section “Ways Forward,” several
challenges and threats that online terrorism will pose in the future. Although
findings and newly built tools to counter online terrorism offer reason for optimism,
new threats emerge at a similar rate through the expansion of technological
advancement. Future work will have to efficiently recognize the importance of
cybersecurity related to the online war of terror and the impact that neglecting it
has had on the world. Containing online resources that advance terrorism is an
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increasingly critical task, since a simple video, a brief message, or a single tweet
could represent an individual’s turning point between peace and terrorism.
Notes
1

It is important to note that Islamic terrorism is based on a radical interpretation of
the Quran that is, in general, not representative of the Islamic religion. The term
“Islamic terrorism” is highly politicized and should by no means serve as a
reference to Islamic tradition. It is used throughout this article exclusively as a
means to describe violent groups who claim religious motivations behind their
attacks.
2

One example includes the use of a black banner. The black banner contains many
different Islamic references. For instance, it is assumed that a black banner was
used when Abu Muslim led the Abbasid Revolution in 747 CE.
3

Video game mods are defined as “short modifications” of the game by external
parties such as fans or players.
4

Also known as Islamic State Tech.

5

Also known as The Sharp-Edged Sword.

6

One notable example relates to the “Think Again Turn Away” social media
campaign, launched by the US Department of State, which accumulated a modest
44,000 followers on Twitter and Facebook combined (General Intelligence and
Security Service, 2012).
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